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Notes
EVIDENCE-DISCLOSURE OF THE FACT OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE IN ACCIDENT LITIGATION
It is clearly the general rule, subject to certain exceptions and
qualifications, that in a personal injury or wrongful death action evi-
dence is inadmissible which informs the jury that the defendant is
wholly or partially insured against liability. Such evidence is not only
inadmissible because it is ordinarily irrelevant to the material issues
in the case, but because it is likely to have a prejudicial effect. It is
commonly believed that a knowledge of the fact of insurance may
motivate jurors to be reckless in awarding damages which will be
paid not by the defendant but "by a supposedly well-pursed and heart-
less insurance company that has already been paid for taking the risk."'
There are other ways, of course, other than by the direct introduction
of evidence, that the interest of an insurer may be revealed. Counsel
may inject the fact of insurance in his voir dire examination of the
jury, in his opening statement or in other remarks to the jury, or in his
final argument or summation. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has
warned, however, that ". . . no other court has been any more strict
than we in ruling that any deliberate disclosure to the jury that a
defendant is protected by indemnity insurance is prejudicial miscon-
duct."2 But this so-called rule of exclusion is not absolute. There are
certain conditions under which "reference to liability insurance will
not be deemed prejudicial and will not require the trial judge to set
aside the swearing of the jury."
3
It is the primary purpose of this note to examine these rules of
evidence and procedure as they are applied by Kentucky courts in
automobile accident cases where plaintiff's counsel4 has attempted to
introduce the insurance factor,5 and to consider the ultimate problem
1 2 Wigmore, Evidence sec. 282a (3d ed. 1940).2 Ideal Pure Milk Co. v. Whitaker, 243 S.W. 2d 479, 480 (Ky. 19.51).
3 Terminal Transport Co. v. Berry, 217 F. 2d 32, 33 (6th Cir. 1954) (apply-
ing Kentucky law).
4 Where nothing has been said or done from which the jury can presume
that the defendant is protected, it is, of course, just as improper for the defendant
to show that he does not carry liability insurance as it is for the plaintiff to show
that he does. 4 A.L.R. 2d 773 (1949).
5 Kentucky, for the most part, mirrors the other American jurisdictions; par-
ticular attention has been given to those rare instances where the Kentucky courts
veer from the charted course. For an exhaustive treatment of the subject gen-
erally, see Annot., 56 A.L.R. 1418 (1928); supplemented by 74 A.L.R. 849
(1931), 95 A.L.R. 888 (1935), 105 A.L.R. 1319 (1936); superceded by 4 A.L.R.
2d 761 (1949).
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presented by the Kentucky cases: When should a new trial be granted,
or a judgment reversed, because incompetent evidence or statements
have crept into the trial proceedings. The writer will briefly offer his
evaluation of the present rules, and consider the merits of suggested
reforms of and substitutes for the general rule of exclusion. The prob-
lems arising from the conflict between the rigidly promulgated rule
against the admission of the fact of insurance and the real party in
interest rule, which requires the joinder of insurance companies when
there has been an assignment, is not within the scope of this note.6
The Disclosure of Insurance at Pretrial Proceedings
Before considering the general rule of exclusion as it is applied in
the courtroom, it is well to inquire whether the defendant's insurance
coverage may be disclosed at a pre-trial examination or discovery pro-
ceeding. The leading recent authority on this subject is Maddox v.
Grauman,7 a 1954 Kentucky case. In this case, counsel for the plaintiff,
pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 26.01, proceeded on
discovery to take a pre-trial deposition of the defendant. Defendant's
counsel, however, refused to permit his client to answer questions
which would reveal whether or not he was insured, and, if so, the
name of his insurance company and the limits of liability provided by
the policy. Defendant was found guilty of contempt for failure to
comply with Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02, but enforcement
of punishment was withheld pending a final ruling of the appellate
court.
The Court of Appeals determined that the inquiry was within the
scope of the examination contemplated by Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure 26.02; the insurance question would be relevant to the sub-
ject matter if the plaintiff prevailed, 8 and should be relevant while the
action was pending. The Court, however, pointed out that it still
recognized and adhered "to the principle of law, long established in
this jurisdiction, that a reference to automobile liability insurance
made in order to bias the minds of the jury at the trial is improper
and will in practically every case constitute reversible error. .. ."
It was not contended in this case, said the Court, that the fact of in-
surance should be made known to the jury.
6 For a recent discussion of full and partial assignment by the insured, and
the loan arrangement between insurer and insurer, see 46 Ky. L.J. 252 (1958).
7 265 S.W. 2d 939, 41 A.L.R. 2d 964 (Ky. 1954).
8 If a judgment should be recovered against the defendant and thereafter an
execution should be returned, "No property found," then, under the policy's in-
solvency provision, the plaintiff could bring an ancillary proceeding or independent
action against the defendant's insurance company. Id. at 941.
R Id. at 942.
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Perhaps a majority of those jurisdictions wherein this question has
arisen has supported the Kentucky view and allowed a pre-trial
examination or discovery proceeding in tort actions to ascertain the
existence and amount of liability insurance and the identity of the
insurer.'0
The Voir Dire Examination: "A Shield and Not a Dagger"
It has been generally held that attorneys may in good faith inter-
rogate prospective jurors on voir dire as to their own or their relatives'
connection with or interest in liability or indemnity insurance corpora-
tions. If counsel is to exercise intelligently his right of peremptory
challenge, it is apparent that he may be able to inject the insurance-
bogy before the veniremen have even been comfortably seated; and
there may be little that the defendant's attorney can do about it.
This "good faith interrogation privilege" has evolved from a
balancing of: (1) the right of the plaintiff's counsel to see that persons
do not serve as jurors who are antagonistic to the payment of claims
which insurance companies must satisfy, and (2) the right of the
defendant's counsel to prevent, so far as possible, jurors from learning
that his client is insured against liability and will not have to satisfy
personally an adverse judgment. These rights, of course, cannot be
readily compromised. The tendency has been to allow inquiry, but
to restrict it as much as possible. Plaintiffs counsel cannot direct his
questions indiscriminately-he must act in the utmost "good faith,"
and to protect some right of his client. "Good faith", however, is often
difficult to pin down. In some jurisdictions, it is almost presumed
from a cautious, formbook interrogation, and "bad faith" is left as a
matter of inference from questions "thought" to hide an ulterior
motive. But other jurisdictions add some standard to aid the courts
in the exercise of their discretion, such as the requirement that the
plaintiff's attorney reasonably believe or know that the defendant is
insured." Kentucky is one of a few states which enforce another com-
mon-sense rule: counsel must have reason to believe that one or more
of the veniremen has a disqualifying interest. "Good faith," then, ac-
cording to the modern Kentucky rule, depends upon whether the
plaintiff's attorney has reasonable grounds for a belief that the de-
fendant carries liability insurance and that a juror has some prejudicial
lo For annotations of interest in this connection, see 41 A.L.R. 2d 968 (1955).
11 Duncan Coal Co. v. Thompson's Adm'r 157 Ky. 304, 162 S.W. 1139
(1914). The Kentucky requirements were first suggested in Dow Wire Works
Co. v. Morgan, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 854, 96 S.W. 530 (1906). See Potter v. Trent,
262 S.W. 2d 186 (Ky. 1958).
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interest in an insurance company.12 While it does not seem to be re-
quired, the safest practice would be for the plaintiff's counsel to sup-
port his "belief" that a venireman has a disqualifying interest by af-
fidavit. If the court has a doubt as to good faith, it will find bad
faith and discharge the panel. An affidavit stating only that "it is pos-
sible or even highly probable" that the panel contained interested per-
sons has been thrown out as too indefinite in the absence of supporting
information.' 3 Unless a particular panel member's connection with a
particular insurance company is set forth either orally or by affidavit,
the courts will almost certainly find a lack of good faith.14 However,
a prospective juror by his answers to questions divorced from insurance
may himself raise a reasonable doubt as to his disinterest. Accordingly,
if a panel member states his occupation as "real estate," a question as
to whether he wrote any insurance in connection with his business
has been held proper since real estate agents are known to dabble in
insurance.la
Whether the veniremen should be interrogated individually or col-
lectively, and whether a specific insurance company should be men-
tioned, is left primarily to the discretion of the trial judge. In Ken-
tucky, upon a showing of reasonable grounds for the interrogation,
counsel has been permitted to phrase his questions in general form
and to put them to the entire panel (apparently even though he sets
forth grounds for challenge against but one or several of the mem-
bers); for example, counsel may ask: "Are any of you at the present
time employed by or interested in any accident insurance company?"";
In summary, the rule which excludes evidence that the defendant
in a personal injury case is indemnified does not prohibit the plaintiff's
counsel from attempting to secure an impartial jury. But counsel must
act in good faith; his examination must not be merely an adroit
manuever to place the fact of insurance before the jury. As stated in
a West Virginia decision:
'12 According to Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W. 2d 939, 41 A.L.R. 2d 964
(Ky. 1954), discussed supra, counsel could easily discover whether or not the
efdant was insured by taking a pre-trial deposition.
13 Netter v. Caldwell, 173 Ky. 200, 204, 190 S.W. 721, 722-728 (1917).
For an interesting case concerning the proper substance of affidavits, see Moore
v. Edmonds, 384 I1. 535, 52 N.E. 2d 216 (1944), and the concurring opinion.
1 See Ewing-Von Allmen Dairy Co. v. Godwin, 304 Ky. 161, 200 S.W. 2d
103 (1947).
15 Ashland Sanitary Milk Co. v. Messersmith's Adm'r, 236 Ky. 91, 95-96,
82 S.W. 2d 727, 729-730 (1930). CLf. Goldberg v. Wunderlich, 248 Ky. 798, 59
S.W. 2d 1018 (1933).
16 See Hoagland v. Dolan, 2.59 Ky. 1, 4, 81 S.W. 2d 869, 870 (1935). See
also Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co. v. Duganics, 113 S.W. 128 (Ky. 1908); Owens-
boro Wagon Co. v. Boling, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 816, 107 S.W. 264 (1908).
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In the armory of the law, the privilege of counsel to inter-
rogate jurors on their voir dire is a shield and not a dagger-a shield
to protect a client and not a dagger to stab his opponent. Counsel
must not mistake his weapon.17
The Rule of Exclusion
The vast majority of the personal injury or wrongful death actions
in which the injection of defendant's insurance becomes a matter of
dispute are the result of automobile accidents. But other kinds of
negligent conduct may be the subject of the litigation; the defendant
may, for instance, be indemnified against injuries to employees or
other persons on his premises caused by his or his agents' negligent
acts. But from whatever cause the action may arise, the fact that the
defendant carries accident insurance is generally not relevant or com-
petent in any inquiry into fault or amount of damages. Such evidence
cannot be introduced to imply that the accused would as a consequence
exercise less than ordinary care.
Furthermore, it is thought that jurors as a class are prejudiced
against insurance corporations. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has
indicated from time to time that it subscribes to this notion. This
prejudice, it has been said, wells from a "well known trait of human
nature-possessed by jurors as well as others-to be less inclined to
give the testimony the same weight as against a neighbor, acquain-
tance, or friend, as against insurance companies, many of which are
foreign to the jurisdiction." 8 In Star Furniture Company v. Holland,'
the Court stated that "the average juror is either unconsciously or
otherwise influenced by the fact that the alleged negligent actor
carries insurance... [He] is frequently led astray and returns an un-
authorized verdict because he concludes that the defendant.. . will
not be required to pay it out of his individual funds. .. " If this is
true, there is no wonder that attorneys for the plaintiff, who are often
paid on a contingent or percentage basis, are constantly devising new
and ingenious ways to give cases an "insurance coating" without in-
curring a retrial or a new trial.
Evidence suggesting that an insurance company is the real de-
fendant may be brought out at various stages of the trial. In the
absence of qualifying circumstances, it almost invariably constitutes
reversible error. The attorney for the plaintiff certainly should not
1
7 Adams v. Cline Ice Cream Co., 101 W. Va. 85, 181 S.E. 867 868 (1926),
quoted in Helton v. Prater's Adm'r, 272 Ky. 574, 580, 114 S.W. 2d 1120, 1123-
1124 (1938).
18 Turpin v. Scrivner, 297 Ky. 865, 368, 178 S.W. 2d 971, 973 (1944).
'0 273 Ky. 617, 624, 117 S.W. 2d 603, 607 (1938).
[Vol. 46,
be permitted to bring out the insurance factor in the direct examina-
tion of the plaintiff or plaintiff's witnesses, or by the introduction of
documents. The same prohibition applies, with a few possible excep-
tions, to the redirect examination. There are many clever ways in
which the fact of insurance may be deliberately elicited from a willing
witness. The plaintiff's counsel knows that he cannot directly refer to
the insurance, and since the defense will immediately move to set
aside the swearing of the jury upon testimony which remotely touches
on the existence of insurance, he must be so deft in his interrogation
that the trial judge will refuse to grant the adverse motion. He usually
does not succeed. And if at first he does succeed, he still must face
the possibility of appellate reversal. It has been the practice of the
Court of Appeals to reverse a judgment of the trial court, even when
the defendant's objection to a question-and-answer was sustained and
the jury admonished, when it appears that the jury was prejudiced by
the questioner's deliberate attempt "to influence the jury... upon the
issue of culpable negligence, as well as the amount of remuneration."20
The Court is particularly quick to find deliberateness of purpose when
the record reveals counsel's persistent efforts to inject the insurance
issue.
21
An objectionable examination of the plaintiff may take the fol-
lowing form:
Q. Do you know T? A. Yes.
Q. At the time I talked with you, was he acting, or was he pur-
porting to be acting on behalf of the defendant in the investiga-
tion of this accident?
Such a seemingly innocent exchange took place in Thurmond v. Chum-
bier's Adm'x, 22 a 1956 case. After the defendant's objection, the ex-
aminer complained that he was going no further than the mere show-
ing of T's investigation; the trial judge, however, sustained the objec-
tion for the reason that counsel was "getting too close to dangerous
ground." The Court of Appeals reversed the subsequent judgment
for the plaintiff, commenting that the questions alone were sufficient
to cause the jury to speculate as to just what T's interest was. T was,
in fact, an investigator for the defendant's insurance carrier.
23
2o0bid.
21 The Court has indicated that an act of impropriety may be overlooked if
the trial court properly admonishes the jury to disregard it, but not where the
record shows a persistence on counsel's part in injecting matters which tend to
inflame the jury. See Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co. v. Duganics, 113 S.W. 128
(Ky. 1908). See also Netter v. Caldwell, 173 Ky. 200, 190 S.W. 721 (1917);
Owensboro Wagon Co. v. Boling, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 816, 107 S.W. 264 (1908).
22 287 S.W. 2d 908, 912 (Ky. 1956).2 3 For illustrations of other direct examinations where the plaintiff's attorney
got into trouble, see Howard v. Adams, 246 S.W. 2d 1002 (Ky. 1952); Randle
1958] NoTs
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The cross-examination or recross-examination cannot be used as a
tool to elicit statements in regard to accident insurance. There is some
indication, however, that when the plaintiff's counsel is cross-examin-
ing a hostile witness, and the witness, in response to questioning,
mentions the interested insurance company, the Court is less likely to
find prejudice. For instance, if the cross-examiner subtly asks a de-
fense witness if he made an accident report to anyone, and the witness
replies that he reported to the insurance company, an admonishment
to the jury may cure the impropriety.24 But the questions cannot be
too obvious. If the defendant is asked whether he expects to pay the
judgment, the Court will generally reverse, and especially if the trial
judge has failed to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony and the
damages awarded are excessive. 25 When the defendant's attorney is
cross-examining the plaintiff or a witness for the plaintiff, the Court
has held that if the witness is merely responding to questions asked,2
or if the reply is made to an incorrect leading question,27 the reference
to insurance will be disregarded, or, at least, automatically cured by
an instruction to the jury. It should be a different matter if the hostile
witness, without provocation, injects the insurance issue into the case.
In Heil v. Seidel,28 the appellate court had an opportunity to clearly
enunciate this latter rule, but failed to do so. In that case, plaintiff's
witness was asked on cross-examination when he first talked to the
attorney for the plaintiff, and he replied, "Not very long ago. A con-
siderable time after the insurance company's attorney came to see
me."29 The trial court overruled a motion to discharge the jury, but
instructed the jury to disregard the answer. On appeal, the Court
noted that the answer was unsolicited, but that it did not indicate
what the insurance was for and so constituted no substantial prejudice
to the defendant's rights.
30
v. Mitchell, 283 Ky. 501, 142 S.W. 2d 124 (1940); Star Furniture Co. v. Holland,
273 Ky. 617, 117 S.W. 2d 603 (1938); Trevilian v. Boswell, 241 Ky. 237, 43
S.W. 2d 715 (1931).24 Tri-State Refining Co. v. Skaggs, 223 Ky. 731, 4 S.W. 2d 739 (1928).
25 Stott v. Hinkle, 286 Ky. 143, 150 S.W. 2d 655 (1941). See also Danville
Light, Power & Traction Co. v. Baldwin, 178 Ky. 184, 198 S.W. 713 (1917);
Owensboro Wagon Co. v. Boling, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 816, 107 S.W. 264 (1908).
26 Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Hopkins, 228 Ky. 184, 14 S.W. 2d 768
(1929).27 Terminal Transport Co. v. Berry, 217 F. 2d 32, 33 (6th Cir. 1954) (ap-
plying Kentucky law). In this case, plaintiff's witness was asked: "Didn't you
step [the sidewalk] . . .off as 43 steps?" The witness replied: "I didn't step it-
now, your insurance man done that." The Court determined that the witness
merely denied the improper question and then gave the correct facts.
28249 Ky. 314, 60 S.W. 2d 626 (1933).
29 Id. at 316, 60 S.W. 2d at 627.
30 
It may be significant that the plaintiff in the Heil case was a young boy,
and that the verdict awarded him amounted to $10,250 for his serious injuries.
[Vol. 46,
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The courts should be alert to the purposeful injection of evidence
that the defendant is protected by indemnity or liability insurance.
Whether the testimony as to insurance was intentional and prejudicial
is, of course, largely a matter of judicial discretion.
Exceptions to and Qualifications of the Rule of Exclusion
It has been said that no rule is so universally accepted as not to be
subject to exceptions. And it is clear that the existence of defendant's
liability or indemnity insurance may become the subject of evidence
and the object of interrogatories when it bears upon an issue in the
case. In other words, the suggestion of insurance will not be avoided
at the cost of suppressing evidence ordinarily material. The Kentucky
courts have agreed that the insurance issue may come in under the
multiple admissibility rule to show business connection or employment,
ownership or control of the property involved in the accident, kinship,
bias or interest of witnesses, "or to illustrate or explain any other fact
or circumstance bearing on any issue made by the pleadings."31
It is generally recognized, though there have been no Kentucky
decisions on the matter, that when there is a dispute as to the existence
of an employer-employee relationship it is usually proper to show that
the defendant carries accident insurance on his employees and that he
carried such insurance on the co-defendant. In addition, evidence of
insurance may be admitted which tends to prove the ownership of the
injuring instrumentality, since persons do not ordinarily provide insur-
ance on property which they do not own.
3 2
It has also been uniformly held that the plaintiff has a salutary
right to show a witness's relationship to the defendant's insurance
company where such evidence tends to show special interest or bias.
If the insurance company chooses to place its "own" witness on the
stand, it must lose its privilege of remaining anonymous. In Hedger v.
Davis,33 for instance, a physician called by the defendant testified that
he examined the plaintiff and found him to be without injury. On
cross-examination, he was asked: "How did you happen to go down
to see [the plaintiff] .. 2" The witness replied: "At the request of Mr.
Page of the insurance company."34 It was subsequently developed
For a general discussion of unresponsive testimony by the plaintiff or his witnesses
on direct examination and of the effect of "vague" references to insurance, see
infra, pp. 485, 486.
31 Trevillian v. Boswell, 241 Ky. 237, 241, 43 S.W. 2d 715, 717 (1931).
32See Gayheart v. Smith, 240 Ky. 596, 42 S.W. 2d 877 (1931). See also
Dixie-Ohio Express Co., Inc. v. Webb, 299 Ky. 201, 184 S.W. 2d 361 (1944).
33236 Ky. 432, 33 S.W. 2d 310 (1930).
34 Id. at 433, 33 S.W. 2d at 310.
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that the physician had made a report to the insurance agent. The
Court permitted the testimony, holding that questions could be asked
in good faith and in proper form35 which tended to disclose possible
bias even though such inquiry necessarily implied that the defendant
was protected by insurance.3 6 The Court has also held that it is not
error to allow evidence which shows that a witness who had procured
a release from the plaintiff was a representative of an insurance com-
pany since it would be unfair to permit such a witness to "pose before
the jury as entirely disinterested . . ."37 Following in this same vein,
the Court of Appeals has allowed the plaintiff to show that a previously
written statement, introduced to impeach the plaintiff's witness, was
procured by an employee of the defendant's insurer, at least when the
testimony bears no "ear-marks of premeditation and prearrangement."
3 3
In a recent case, the Court noted that the "special-interest exception"
to the rule of exclusion was "peculiarly susceptible of abuse."3 9 It
would appear, therefore, that the plaintiffs cause will be better
shielded on appeal if the trial judge has admonished the jury not to
consider the evidence for any purpose other than the showing of bias
or special interest.
Again when the defendant makes an oral statement at the scene
of the accident which amounts to an admission of liability, many
jurisdictions hold that it cannot conveniently be eliminated from testi-
mony even though the jury may be thereby apprised of insurance
coverage. But the Kentucky Court of Appeals has demonstrated a
tendency to overlook this general exception to the rule of exclusion.
Testimony of a witness that the defendant told the plaintiff, following
an automobile collision, that "you will have no trouble... [I have my]
car insured," has been held no part of the res gestae. Such a statement,
according to the Court, "shed no light on the issue of negligence or
contributory negligence...-40
3 5 In pursuing his advantage, plaintiff's counsel phrased his questions in a
nice7 form. He never referred to the insurer directly, but quizzed the witness
only in regard to his contracts with "Mr. Page," whom the witness himself had
dearly identified as an insurance agent.
36See Lexington Glass Co. v. Zurich General Acc. & L. Ins. Co., 271 S.W.
2d 909 (Ky. 1954); Silver Fleet Motor Express v. Gilbert, 291 Ky. 696, 165 S.W.
2d 541 (1942). Cf. Herbold v. Ford Motor Co., 310 Ky. 697, 221 S.W. 2d 646
(1949).3 7 Coral Ridge Clay Products Co. v. Collins, 181 Ky. 818, 825, 205 S.W. 958,
961 (1918).3
6Reddy Cab Co. v. Harris, 262 Ky. 661, 665, 90 S.W. 2d 1004, 1006 (1936).
See Marsee v. Johnson, 260 Ky. 615, 86 S.W. 2d 299 (1935). Cf. Cadle v.
McHargue, 249 Ky. 385, 60 S.W. 2d 973 (1933).
39Triplett v. Napier, 286 S.W. 2d 87, 89 (Ky. 1956).4 0 Trevillian v. Boswell, 241 Ky. 237, 242, 43 S.W. 2d 715, 717 (1931). See
also Dunaway v. Darnell, 302 S.W. 2d 122 (Ky. 1957).
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In addition to these well-recognized exceptions, there are also cer-
tain so-called "qualifications" of the general rule against the admission
of evidence relating to the defendant's insurance protection.
A number of cases have determined that voluntary, unexpected and
unresponsive testimony to the effect that the defendant carries accident
insurance will not necessarily be a ground for reversible error even
when the statements are made by the plaintiff or his witness to friendly
counsel. These improper references may come in reply to the most
innocent of questions. As an example, in Bowling Green-Hopkinsville
Bus Co. v. Montgomery,41 the plaintiff's witness was asked on direct
examination if he knew who had the measurements of the truck in-
volved in the accident. The reply: "No sir, unless the insurance com-
pany might have them."42 Whether such statements are regarded by
the trial judge as completely unsolicited must depend, to a large extent,
upon the demeanor of the parties-whether the questioner's surprise is
apparently genuine and the witness's remark is made in a normal, off-
hand manner. These instant impressions cannot be captured by the
court reporter. Perhaps that is why the cold questions and answers
of a trial transcript may, on occasion, raise a doubt in the reader's
mind as to their spontaneity. In a 1925 Kentucky case,43 for instance,
the plaintiff was asked by whom he had been medically examined, and
he "unresponsively" replied: "The insurance company sent up-," but
he was cut off by his counsel who warned: "Don't say that." The wit-
ness continued: "Dr. Humphrey and Dr. Zimmerman." And then, re-
markably enough, the next question was: "Who sent them to you?"
The witness answered: "The insurance company." Plaintiffs counsel
immediately stated that he "did not . . . intend that and I move to
strike that out."44 The Court of Appeals, noticing that the verdict was
"very reasonable," sustained the trial court's refusal to discharge the
jury, and declared that counsel exhibited his good faith by admonish-
ing his own witness. And besides, said the Court, the witness did not
say what insurance company sent the doctors up.
45
But if the reference to insurance is too pointed, the statement may
be considered so prejudicial as to be unsusceptible of cure. In a 1949
Kentucky case, the plaintiff's physician volunteered that "[t]he insur-
41 278 Ky. 837, 129 S.W. 2d 535 (1939).
42 Id. at 842, 129 S.W. 2d at 538.
4 3 Felder v. Wilbers, 208 Ky. 830, 271 S.W. 1096 (1925). Cf. Chambers v.
Hawkins, 233 Ky. 211, 25 S.W. 2d 363 (1930).
44 Id. at 831, 271 S.W. at 1097.
45 For other cases involving "unresponsive testimony," see Huls v. Dazell, 252
Ky. 13, 66 S.W. 2d 28 (1933); Heil v. Seidel, 249 Ky. 314, 60 S.W. 2d 626
(1933). A clear and concise summarization of this qualification of the general
rule of exclusion is found in Rose v. Edmonds, 271 Ky. 86, 44, 111 S.W. 427, 431
(1937).
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ance company has got a lot of money; we try to add up to them once
in a while."46 The Court admitted that the statement was probably in-
nocently made, but was "made by a professional man. . . . [He] ...
did not stop with directing the spotlight on the fact that payment of
any damages awarded would not be borne by the defendant but by an
insurance company-so often regarded as 'fair game, " but implied his
approval.4
7
As has been indicated previously, if a statement is indefinite and
vague as to the nature of the insurance, as well as gratuitous, and ,f
the trial judge hastens to instruct the jury not to consider the statement,
it will rarely constitute reversible error. If, for example, the reference
fails to reveal clearly which party was insured, or that the "insurance"
covered personal injuries rather than property damage, then the Court
will ordinarily find that the defendant was not substantially prejudiced
thereby.48 It has been generally admitted also that the plaintiff's at-
torney may be pardoned for underlining, either by cross-examination
or otherwise, the fact that the defendant was insured against personal
liability, if it appears that he was provoked or invited by the repre-
hensible conduct of opposing counsel. Certainly the plaintiff's attorney
should be able to allude to the defendant's accident insurance in re-
sponse to an assertion by the defense that an adverse verdict would
signal financial ruin to the defendant.
4 9
Arguments and Statements by Counsel: A "Latitude-But No License
Unless qualifying facts furnish a legal excuse, direct or implied
references to the defendant's insurance made either in the opening
statement or closing argument, or in side remarks during the progress
of the trial, are improper. In 1938, the Court of Appeals stated that
it had "consistently held ... that it is improper for counsel to make
any reference to the fact that the defendant carries liability insurance
or to make statements necessarily carrying the inference that such is
the fact."50 Nevertheless, attorneys, from time to time, still founder
46 Kaufman-Straus Co. v. Short, 311 Ky. 78, 79, 223 S.W. 2d 367 (1949).
47 Id. at 80, 223 S.W. 2d at 368.
48 See Struetker v. Neiser, 290 S.W. 2d 781 (Ky. 1956); Crawford v.
Alexander, 259 S.W. 2d 476 (Ky. 1953). See also Felder v. Wilbers, 208 Ky. 830,271 S.W. 1096 (1925).
49 Cf. Walden v. Jones, 289 Ky. 395, 158 S.W. 2d 609, 141 A.L.R. 105
(1942). But cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Commonwealth, 231 Ky. 346, 21 S.W.
2d 452 (1929).
50 Helton v. Praters Admr, 272 Ky. 574, 578, 114 S.W. 2d 1120, 11253
(1938). Where the statement contained no direct implication that the defendant
carried liability insurance, and was otherwise so vague that an "intelligent juror"
could not have been mislead, the Court has found no prejudicial error. Breslin v.
Blair, 249 Ky. 178, 60 S.W. 2d 337 (1933); Belle of Nelson Distilling Co. v.
Riggs, 104 Ky. 1, 45 S.W. 99 (1898).
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their clients' cases by their flagrant statements to the jury. Such an
assertion as, "Gentlemen, if you want to take this money from this in-
surance company, why we would have built up our case,"51 are ob-
viously foredoomed. But the improper statement can constitute pre-
judicial error even though the word, "insurance," is not expressly
mentioned. The following covert references have been held to require
a new trial:
You can . . . give a judgment for $10,000.00 and it won't hurt the
[defendant] . . . a bit.52
When I saw the astute lawyer, .. ., here appearing for the defendant
in this case, I knew that a verdict in this case would not hurt [him].
.53
In his opening or closing remarks to the jury, the plaintiff's counsel
often gets into difficulty by alleging that the defendant, at the time of
the accident, admitted his fault and that the plaintiff should be com-
pensated. 54 In Trevillian v. Boswell, counsel declared:
... [The] defendant stated it was his truck, and that he was carrying
insurance on his car, and that there would be no trouble to him, for
plaintiff to fix up his statement and send it to the company.5 5
The Court of Appeals held that this statement contributed to a finding
of reversible error.
As stated by the Court, "great latitude is allowed counsel in pre-
senting arguments to the jury, but care should be observed... to con-
fine the consideration of the jury to the case before it."6 Counsel in
a personal injury action should not be permitted to make any state-
ments suggesting that the defendant is insured when the fact of insur-
ance is not germane and has no probative value.
What Constitutes Substantial Prejudice?
In the final accounting, it is the task of the appellate court to de-
termine the prejudicial effect, if any, of incompetent references to the
defendant's liability insurance. If the trial judge improperly admits
51 Plaintiffs counsel contended he meant to say "Indian Company," instead
of "insurance company," but the Court of Appeals was unimpressed. Indian Re-
fining Co. v. Crain, 280 Ky. 112, 114, 132 S.W. 2d 750, 751 (1939). See Helton
v. Prater's Adm'r, supra note 50; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Commonwealth, 231
Ky. 346, 21 S.W. 2d 452 (1929).52 Randle v. Mitchell, 283 Ky. 501, 502, 142 S.W. 2d 124, 125 (1940).
5 3s Walden v. Jones, 289 Ky. 395, 401, 158 S.W. 2d 609, 612, 141 A.L.R. 105
(1942). See Stott v. Hinkle, 286 Ky. 143, 150 S.W. 2d 655 (1941).
5"fBybee v. Shanks, 253 S.W. 2d 257 (1952). See Turpin v. Scrivner, 297
Ky. 365, 178 S.W. 2d 971 (1944); Nickell v. Stewart, 291 Ky. 4, 163 S.W. 2d 39
(1942); Star Furniture Co. v. Holland, 273 Ky. 617, 117 S.W. 2d 603 (1938). See
discussion of the Court's view upon the introduction of evidence that the defendant
"admitted" his fault, supra, p. 484.
55 241 Ky. 237, 239, 43 S.W. 2d 715, 716 (1931).
56 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Commonwealth, 231 Ky. 346, 352-353, 21 S.W.
2d 452, 455 (1929).
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evidence revealing insurance coverage, this will generally constitute
reversible error unless it clearly appears that the defendant was not
prejudiced thereby. As we have seen, evidence competent upon some
material issue, or which tends to establish bias, will not be excluded
merely because it unveils the existence of insurance-so long as the
limits of its admission are not transcended; nor will incidental, invited,
unresponsive, or indefinite remarks necessarily require a reversal, es-
pecially if they have been excluded from the jury's consideration.
The question arises as to whether the prompt exclusion of im-
proper testimony or other statements, coupled with an instruction to
the jury and a reprimand of the offending attorney or witness, should
be considered a sufficient remedy. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
has wavered in its opinion of the curative effect of an emphatic ad-
monition. In Trevillian v. Boswell,5 7 the Court commented that even
where a proper reference to insurance was made, the lower court
should instruct the jury that it could not consider such evidence for
any purpose except that for which it was admitted. The majority of
Kentucky decisions have reflected an approval of a prompt and careful
instruction to the jury, whose members have been previously qualified
as to interest, to disregard improper statements; in fact, it might be
said that a virtual presumption arises that a seemly admonishment suf-
ficiently protected the defendant's rights in the absence of any indica-
tion that the verdict was adversly affected. But it has been suggested,
on occasion, that such an instruction may not only fail to eradicate
the effect of a reference to insurance, but may, in fact, serve to ac-
centuate it in the minds of the jurors. In Consolidated Coach Corpora-
tion v. Hopkins,5 8 the defendant appealed the trial court's failure to
exclude an improper statement; but the appellate Court declared that
if the motion had been sustained and the jury admonished, it was
"likely emphasis and prominence would have been given to [the state-
ment] .. . and greater damage done appellant than letting it alone."59
As we have previously intimated, the reader would be remiss if he
attempted to evaluate the Court's wisdom in determining whether, in
a particular case, the defendant's cause was prejudiced, by merely
looking at the statement or evidence complained of. It must be remem-
57 241 Ky. 237, 242, 43 S.W. 2d 715, 718 (dictum) (1931).
58228 Ky. 184, 14 S.W. 2d 768 (1929).
59 Id. at 194, 14 S.W. 2d at 773. See Terminal Transport Co. v. Berry, 217
F. 2d 32 (6th Cir. 1954); Turner v. Smith, 313 Ky. 635, 232 S.W. 2d 1006
(1950). In an analogous case, Dunaway v. Darnell, 302 S.W. 2d 122 (Ky. 1957),
the Court pointed out that the trial judge, in the course of answering a juror's
question, referred at some length to the injection of insurance by both counsels.
This was improper, said the Court, and called attention to, rather than deempha-
sized, the fact that the defendant carried insurance.
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bered that, regardless of how objectionable a remark may seem, the
Appellate Court will ordinarily refuse to tamper with the trial court's
action if it does not appear that the defendant was in fact prejudiced.
What factors, then, are likely to indicate that a jury was not obedient
to an admonishment (if it was admonished) and was influenced by
incompetent references to insurance? First, the Court will look to the
evidence of record to see whether it was clearly in the plaintiff's favor
or was nicely balanced. Where there appears to have been such a
close question of liability that the slightest suggestion of any extraneous
matter might have tipped the scales in favor of the plaintiff the Court
is likely to reverse a verdict for the plaintiff.60 Secondly, the amount
or size of the verdict may indicate whether the jury was influenced by
considerations other than the law and evidence. The Court of Appeals
will set aside damages which are so excessive as to create the "irre-
sistible inference" that they were "superinduced by passion or preju-
dice." 1 If, however, the fact of defendant's liability is reasonably clear,
the damages are not deemed unreasonable, and no other part of the
verdict reflects any prejudice or adverse influence, then the improper
reference, perhaps even if deliberate, may be treated as error with-
out actual or substantial prejudice. It can safely be said that the Court
will examine the record with a less jaundiced eye if it appears that the
fact of insurance was inadvertently injected, with no purpose to profit
thereby, particularly when there has been a due objection62 and ex-
clusion.03
It is evident, therefore, that no general rules completely solve the
Court's problem of determining whether a defendant's rights have
been substantially prejudiced-so as to require a reversal or new trial.
Each decision must depend upon the circumstances and peculiarities
of the particular case.
60 Walden v. Jones, 289 Ky. 395, 158 S.W. 2d 609, 141 A.L.R. 105 (1942).
See also Nickle v. Stewart, 291 Ky. 4, 163 S.W. 2d 39 (1942).
01 Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Hopkins, 228 Ky. 184, 191, 14 S.W. 2d 768,
772 (1929). See also Crawford v. Alexander, 259 S.W. 2d 476 (Ky. 1953);
Ewing-Von Allmen Dairy Co. v. Godwin, 304 Ky. 161, 200 S.W. 2d 103 (1947);
Indian Refining Co. v. Crain, 280 Ky. 112, 132 S.W. 2d 750 (1939).
62 The defendant's counsel may be estopped from seeking redress if a timely
objection has not been made. See Park v. Schell, 220 Ky. 317, 295 S.W. 161
(1927). An objection is implicit in the motion to discharge the jury. Kaufman-
Straus Co. v. Short, 311 Ky. 78, 223 S.W. 2d 367 (1949). It should also be noted
that the reviewing court cannot consider alleged prejudicial language of counsel
during the trial which is set out only in defendant's affidavits, but not authenticated
by the trial court in the bill of exceptions. Heil v. Seidel, 249 Ky. 314, 60 S.W. 2d
626 (1933); Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co. v. Duganics, 113 S.W. 128 (Ky. 1908).
03 Cf. Rose v. Edmonds, 271 Ky. 36, 111 S.W. 2d 427 (1937).
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Alternatives to the Rule of Exclusion
The exclusion, in a personal injury or death action, of the fact that
the defendant is wholly or partially insured against loss is, as we have
seen, based upon two principal grounds: (1) the irrelevancy and
immateriality of the fact of insurance, and (2) its prejudicial character.
But as to this latter ground for exclusion, it has been said that a jury
should be expected to follow the court's instructions, and that the
idea that jurymen will find lawless verdicts against insurance com-
panies "is false, and degrading and unjust to our jurymen. .. ."4 The
real question, however, is whether a jury panel should be presumed
completely innocent of suspecting that a defendant is insured until
that moment at the trial when the fact is revealed. It is difficult to
assume that jurors are entirely ignorant of the wide-spread practice
among automobile owners and employers of carrying liability or in-
demnity insurance. The time has come when most persons own auto-
mobiles, and the jurors themselves are likely to be policyholders. And
while it may be an overstatement to say that "the lawyers who defend
the casualty companies, and their entourage and surroundings" are
as familiar to jurymen as to the trial judge,65 it cannot be denied that
the necessity for keeping "insurance" a forbidden word is not so real
as it once was.
It has been illustrated that no absolute rule of exclusion is prac-
ticable. It is admitted that the plaintiff has a procedural right to chal-
lenge a juror if the latter is interested in any insurance company, and
to question a witness as to his interest or bias, or ownership of the
injuring instrumentality. Surely jurors readily infer from these ex-
changes that the defendant is insured. And on those occasions when
the plaintiff improperly reveals the interest of an insurer, the courts,
in order to determine whether the defendant's cause was "substantially
prejudiced," may have to inquire into "good faith," an ofttimes futile
inquiry, or other equally nebulous criteria. In short, the odds are that
in the average personal injury trial today one, several, or all of the
jurors will suspect the presence of an insurance company, or will be
made aware of such fact by the machinations of a resourceful attorney.
If the trial or Appellate Court determines that the defendant's right
to a fair and impartial trial has been substantially abridged, mistrials
or new trials are necessary, adding to already congested trial dockets,
and causing increased expenditures of money and time."0
64 8 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law sec. 2254 (1931).
65 Ibid.
66 A recent Kentucky case, Scuddy Mining Co. v. Couch, 295 S.W. 2d 553
(1956), may lead to a partial alleviation of the burden of new trials. The Court
of Appeals there remanded a torts ease for a new trial upon damages alone, hold-
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Should the rule of exclusion then, at least as it applies to automobile
accident insurance, be merely reformed or completely abrogated?
Many suggestions have been proffered. Those in favor of retaining
the general rule admit that liability and indemnity insurance is now
so generally owned that a court should, in effect, take judicial notice
of this prevailing practice and knowledge of it by the jury even in the
absence of any direct or oblique reference to the existence of insurance
at the trial. For that reason, it is said, the rule of exclusion should be
invoked only in exceptional cases. The concurring judge, in Terminal
Transport Co. v. Berry, probably had such a liberalization of the rule
in mind when he stated that "a mistrial should never be granted be-
cause of such [insurance] information there disclosed on the ground
that it was prejudicial, except, perhaps, . . . where the disclosure was
manifestly an appeal to passion or prejudice deliberately injected by
the plaintiff." 7 It is generally agreed, also, that there are certain loop-
holes in the present rule, the foremost of which is occasioned by the
courts' tendency to allow the plaintiff's counsel, if he is thought to be
acting in "good faith," almost an unfettered hand in his voir dire
examination. Kentucky, of course, has partially solved this dilemma by
requiring counsel to substantiate in advance his belief that one or more
of the veniremen has a disqualifying interest. It has been alternatively
suggested that the trial judge conduct the voir dire inquiry, but this
is as likely to inform the panel of the defendant's insurer as an inquiry
by the plaintiff's attorney. It has also been advocated that the jury
commissioner examine the prospective jurors before the trial and
eliminate from the list those found to be interested in insurance. One
writer, incorporating this pretrial procedure, has urged that a lengthy
questionnaire, exclusively designed to disclose insurance interests or
connections, be administered and ified before the jury is empanelled.
This questionnaire, answered under oath, would then be available to
the judge and to both attorneys, and would presumably eliminate the
need for voir dire questions relating to accident insurance.0 8 But de-
spite the claim that such a questionnaire would eventualy be looked
upon as routine, the writer fails to see why such a detailed inter-
rogatory would not insinuate the insurance spectre as thoroughly as
an examination on voir dire.
ing that, under the particular circumstances, it would violate the spirit and intent
of Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 59.01 to again require a determination as to
culpability. Cf. Smith v. Webber, 282 S.W. 2d 346 (Ky. 1955). For comment
on the Scuddy decision, see Oberst, "Recent Developments in the Law of Torts,"
46 Ky. L.J. 193, 212 (1958).
67217 F. 2d 32, 35-36 (6th Cir. 1954) (applying Kentucky law).
68See Note, 28 Miss. L.J. 65, 72-73 & note 50 (1956).
1958]
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Another proposal, which has attracted few converts, would remove
motor vehicular accident litigation from the jurisdiction of the trial
courts altogether, and turn all accident claims over to administrative
tribunals, similar in operation to the present-day Workmen's Compen-
sation Boards. 69 The adoption of such a procedure would certainly
spell bad news to attorneys specializing in the trial of negligence
cases.
70
But before retaining a rended version of the rule of exclusion, or
resorting to radical departures from trial by jury, those interested in
the amelioration of the evidentiary and procedural rules in regard to
the exclusion at trial of the defendant's insurance coverage would be
well-advised to consider a more realistic and forthright recommenda-
tion: an open, but controlled, disclosure of liability or indemnity insur-
ance. It has been forcefully contended that it would be less prejudicial
in the long run to admit frankly that insurance is involved, and to
examine the panel under oath as to whether such knowledge would
influence them in their consideration of the case. As stated in a Mis-
souri case:
It may be that a jury, with a full knowledge of the fact being thus
placed upon honor, would be less prejudicially influenced than when
brought into the case under conditions where it is made manifest
that the defendant is trying to keep it out. A reading of the cases
justifies the assertion that, when the fact of insurance is properly ad-
mitted over the objections of counsel, the psychological prejudicial
effect is greater than if admitted under a rule such as is above pre-
sented.71
This is not to suggest that jurymen will not be prejudiced merely
because they have been "put on their honor." If they are plainly told,
however, that insurance is involved, but that a reckless verdict will
be set aside,72 and that an excessive award of damages will only serve
to increase local insurance rates,73 then there is reason to believe that
69 See Note, 10 Fla. L. Rev. 68, 76 (1957).
70 Richardson, "Policy-Oriented Legislation in Accident Litigation," 44 Ky.
L.J. 173, 198-199 (1956).71 Fortner v. Kelly, 227 Mo. App. 933, 60 S.W. 2d 642, 644 (1933). See also
Alguin v. Thygsen, 47 N.M. 377, 143 P. 2d 585 (1948).
72 See 2 WVigmore, Evidence see. 282a (3rd ed. 1940).
73 The fact that higher premium rates may result from large jury awards
should not be over-emphasized, of course. In 1953, the American Associated In-
surance Companies placed advertisements in national magazines which allegedly
caused a downward trend in jury awards. One of these advertisements stated in
part: "... Next time you serve on a jury, remember this: When you are
overly generous with an insurance company's money, you help in-
crease not only your own premiums, but the cost of every article and
service you buy."
The American Bar Association protested such "intimidation," and the notices were
not repeated. See Wallace, Life and Limb 211-213 (1953).
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they will respond with reasonable verdicts, and that the constant evad-
ing and quibbling conspicuous under the present procedure, and the
delays occasioned by new trials for technical errors, can be largely
avoided.
Surveys in two states which have "direct action" statutes, authoriz-
ing an injured party to proceed directly against the insurer, indicate
that verdicts do not run appreciably higher there than in other states1 4
Such a statute might tend to increase insurance rates, but the decrease
in fruitless litigation caused by purported infractions of the rule of
exclusion may be worth the cost. But the most promising of the recom-
mended enactments is a program which would make compulsory the
carrying of liability insurance. It is probable that under such a com-
pulsory insurance plan, where the selected risk type of insurance is
eliminated, insurance rates will rise, but not necessarily so, for the
compulsory feature will provide a wider base for a distribution of
risk.
7 5
Although accident insurance on automobiles is commonly compul-
sory in Europe, it is compulsory in this country only in Massachusetts,
7,
New York77 and North Carolina.78 Surely the time has come for the
other states to consider the adoption of compulsory liability insurance
statutes. More and more high-powered automobiles now crowd the
highways. Thousands of persons are killed each year, and many thou-
sands more are maimed and injured. Property damage is tolled an-
nually in the millions of dollars. These appalling figures are reflected
by the fact that three-fourths of all litigation in the United States now
involves damage suits arising out of personal injury or wrongful death
claims.
Kentucky at the present time operates under a "Financial Re-
sponsibility Law."7 9 Under this act, if the owner or driver of an auto-
mobile is in an accident where the damage is in excess of one hundred
dollars, or where personal injury or death is sustained, he must file a
report showing that he carries liability insurance. If he is not so in-
sured, he must either submit proof that all claims have been settled,
74Richardson, supra note 70, at 197. It has even been said that these two
states, Louisiana and Wisconsin, "are at the bottom of the national scale for
adequate jury awards in personal injury cases." Belli, Ready for the Plaintiff!
229 (1956). But cf. Note, 10 Fla. L. Rev. 68, 75-76 (1957).
75 See Richardson, supra note 70, at 198; Note, 10 Fla. L. Rev. 68, 76 (1957).
It has been said that the insurance industry opposes such a compulsory plan forfear of political rate-setting and excessive losses from bad risk drivers. Belli, op.
cit. supra note 74, at 43 & n., quoting Time, Oct. 17, 1955.7,6Mass. Gen. Laws c. 90, secs. 84A-84J (1932).
77 N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law secs. 93-93K.
'SN.G. Gen. Stat. secs. 20-309 to 20-319 (Supp. 1957). The North Carolina]aw terminates on May 15, 1961.
7 9K . Se. c. 187 (1953).
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or deposit funds or securities sufficient to pay all damages. If the
owner or driver fails to comply with these statutory requirements, his
driver's license, registration certificate and license plate are suspended.
The writer advocates the expedient extension of this statute to require
all automobile owners to carry liability insurance as a condition to
their continued use of the public highways. Under such a plan, the
policyholder should be covered against bodily injury liability up to a
minimum amount of $10,000 for each person, and $20,000 for each
accident; and against property damage liability up to a minimum
amount of $1000 for each accident.80 In lieu of procuring a motor
vehicle policy, a person should be free to deposit with the Department
of Finance cash or securities in the sum of $21,000 as a guaranty for
the payment of judgments rendered against him. A violator of the
statute should be subject to a fine of not less than $500 nor more than
$2000, or imprisonment for not more than one year, plus suspension
of his driver's license for an indefinite period. This is admittedly a
harsh statute, and is by no means a panacea, but it would provide for
partial monetary compensation, at least, of persons (or their survivors)
who are injured or killed as the result of the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle. The estimated thirty to forty per cent of Kentucky's
motor vehicle owners now uninsured against bodily injury and prop-
erty damage would have to invest in insurance or abandon the high-
ways. Under a compulsory insurance statute, the evidentiary rule of
exclusion would cease to be of any real consequence, since a juror
would be presumed to know the laws of his state, and merely refresh-
ing his memory at the trial would be harmless. Then, too, sound public
policy would be served, since "[iln time, under compulsory insurance
uninsurable risks will be removed from the highways to the better-
ment of all interests concerned."
8'
It is evident that alternatives to the present general rule forbidding
the reference to insurance companies in accident litigation are de-
termined not only from a consideration of rules of evidence and pro-
cedure but by policy attitudes toward the role of insurance in society.
Leslie W. Morris II
80 The statute could be alternatively worded to provide for a sliding minimum
which could keep abreast of sharp fluctuations in living costs.
81 Richardson, supra note 70, at 198.
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